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Introduction 
Temptation is normally thought to be morally dubious, in part because 
it involves desiring what we think is immoral, imprudent, illegal, 
unaesthetic, or in some other way wrong or bad. Temptation is also 
believed to be morally questionable in part because tempting is often a 
form of manipulation, which we regard as a violation of a person's 
integrity. ~ As the O.~ford English Dictionary makes clear, temptation has 
an active and a passive dimension, and temptation as manipulating the 
wrongful desires of someone illustrates a common form of actively 
encouraging wrongdoing. Regarding temptation as essentially a matter 
of manipulating others' wrongful desires, though, misleadingly suggests 
that all temptations are interpersonal, intentional, and immoral. However, 
tempting and being tempted may be entirely self-referent ia l ,  
unintentional, and even morally laudatory. These facts suggest that the 
most important dimension of temptation is not the activity of a tempter 
but the subjectivity of the person tempted, since without the wrongful 
desires of the latter temptation of any sort would be impossible. 
Furthermore, the passive dimension of the standard definition of 
temptation, the state of being tempted, implicitly raises the question what 
such a condition involves, and whether it is itself active or passive. If 
being tempted is a psychological condition in which someone is disposed 
toward what he believes is wrong or bad, then it is important to identify 
the beliefs and desires, intentions and motives, knowledge and emotions, 
or combination of these requisite for being tempted. The extent to which 
these states are under our control, perhaps even a matter of choice, bears 
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on whether we are passive victims of temptation, or active participants, 
sometimes even co-conspirators, in our own temptations.: So, if we wish 
to understand temptation as a kind of  moral lapse akin to or perhaps 
even a form of weakness of  will, then the perspective of  the person 
tempted should be the main focus of  a moral analysis of temptation? 
Analyzing the subjectivity of being tempted brings into focus such 
key questions as whether being tempted is an affective or a cognitive 
state, or whether it is a combination of  the two involving a desire for 
what we believe is in some sense evil or wrong. Perhaps temptation is 
even more complex than this, involving in addition a characteristic "'feel" 
such that it is more like an emotion than a desire. Moreover, if temptation 
is not always interpersonal, involving one person seducing another into 
imprudent or otherwise wrong behavior, then how is self-tempting 
different,  both psycho log ica l ly  and morally,  f rom interpersonal 
temptation? Other queries such as what things can tempt, what sorts of 
beings can be tempted, whether it is possible to be tempted to do good, 
whether one is always blameworthy for being tempted or for yielding to 
temptation, and whether temptation ever functions as an excuse for 
wrongdoing, may admit of  clearer resolution by approaching temptation 
from the perspective of a person tempted rather than from the standpoint 
of  a tempter. 
In this paper I explore some of these questions, arguing that although 
temptation is a relational phenomenon involving a tempter and a person 
tempted, temptation depends cruciall.y on the beliefs, desires, and 
emotional attitudes of the person tempted. Moreover, the dependency of 
temptation on the subjectivity of  the person tempted entails that there is 
no logically necessary tie between temptation and evil. I suggest, 
furthermore, that holding someone morally responsible for temptation 
depends on such factors as whether it is interpersonal, intentional, and 
whether and in what sense a moral agent can be held responsible for her 
character. 
I begin by distinguishingdifferent senses of  temptation in order to 
set out more clearly the core moral meaning of  the term. I then offer an 
account of what is involved in temptation from the standpoint of a person 
tempted. This phenomenological account sets the stage for clarifying 
90 
THE LOGIC OF TEMPTATION 
how and under what circumstances we may be tempted to do what is 
morally right or good, and suggests the direction for further research 
into questions about personal responsibility and temptation. 
1. Two Senses of Temptation 
Temptation admits of two normative senses, a primary meaning which 
is essentially moral, and a secondary meaning which is non-moral though 
nevertheless frequently evaluative. The O.vfordAmerican Dictionary lists 
"'to arouse a desire in" and "'to attract'" as this second meaning of the 
term? This common meaning is invoked in such colloquialisms as that I 
was tempted to have another cup of coffee, or phone a friend I haven't 
spoken with in months. These examples suggest that we often use 
temptation to mean nothing more than "'desire" or "'desire to do." and 
thus that temptation is sometimes used in a non-moral way. Though non- 
moral, this sense of temptation may nevertheless be normative, since to 
desire or want to do something often involves possessing a pro-attitude 
toward the object of desire. 
But the central meaning of temptation, according to the Oa~)rd 
English Dictionary, is "'the action of tempting or fact of being tempted, 
especially to evil. ''5 This sense of the term makes clear that both the 
active and passive aspects of temptation have a special relation to evil. 
Although this view may be compatible with being tempted to do good, it 
seems exceedingly odd to suppose, for instance, that someone might be 
tempted to tell the truth, or care lovingly for her child, or obey the law. 
And so we need to know more about the relationship between temptation 
and evil if only to determine whether it is possible to be tempted to do 
that which is right or good. One recent author goes so far as to assert that 
both tempting and being tempted are necessarily immoral, implying that 
the link between temptation and evil is conceptual. 6 If so, then it is not 
merely odd but absurd to suppose we might be tempted to do what is 
right or good. An inquiry into the phenomenology of temptation, 
including the epistemic requirements for being tempted, will help resolve 
some of these questions and clarify the relationship between temptation 
and evil. 
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2. A Phenomenology of Temptation 
A recent account of  temptation maintains that to tempt involves 
intentionally engaging a person's desire for what is in some sense wrong. 7 
This suggests  that temptat ion typically involves a tempter  who 
intentionally stimulates the wrongful desires of someone else, and this 
is surely a plausible account  of  the relational structure of  many 
temptations? Though many temptations involve such manipulation, it is 
important to note that there can be no tempting if there are no people 
with wrongful or unruly desires. Consequently, temptation depends 
essentially on the beliefs, desires, and emotions of those who are tempted. 
What tempters do when they deliberately tempt is an important factor in 
interpersonal temptation. However, the role of the subject of  temptation 
is more complex and theoretically richer than an emphasis on the 
manipulative role of  tempters can recognize.  This is so because 
emphasizing how tempting can be manipulative assumes the centrality 
of  the activity and behavioral consequences of tempting rather than the 
experience of  being tempted and the internal struggle this frequently 
involves. Accordingly, I shall focus primarily on the role of  wrongful 
desires in experiencing temptation, which I will argue is key to a fuller 
account of  the psychological and moral nature of temptation. 
Clearly, tempting involves desire, but since not all desire is temptation, 
they cannot be the same. Moreover, not all desire even for what someone 
believes is evil (e.g. my wish that my  enemy suffer public humiliation) 
is temptation, for though all desire for evil involves an attraction toit ,  it 
does not follow that it involves a motive to cause the evil(my desire that 
my enemy be humiliated in public need not motivate me tO cause his 
humiliation, or to do anything at all): I n  short, desiring does not entail 
being motivated todo  anything2-"Doing something" should be construed 
broadly, for one may be tempted to act, think, or even feel. I take it that 
one may be tempted, for instance, to wallow in self pity, or begrudge 
another her just reward, and not only to behave overtly in some way 
toward another person or thing. Moreover, that temptation involves a 
motive does not imply  that one acts on that motive, for other, even 
incompatible, motives (e.g. self interest), may be stronger, and thus be, 
as Frankfurt would say, one's  effective desire, m 
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Though it is not entirely clear what sorts of things can tempt, it seems 
plausible to suppose that in addition to standard cases of interpersonal 
tempting (i.e. one or more persons tempting another or others) people 
may tempt themselves, or be tempted by inanimate objects or animals. 
Obviously, inanimate things and animals do not make offers, nor do 
they scheme or otherwise intend to take advantage of a person's unruly 
desires, and so being tempted by them does not involve manipulation." 
Still, many people recognize in such objects or beings opportunities that 
arouse their wrongful desires. In this way things and animals may tempt. 
It is important however to recognize that animals and inanimate 
objects like jewels only tempt passively, and are not tempters in anything 
like the sense in which people may be. Though it is reasonable to say of 
a person tempted to steal diamonds that she is tantalized by the glitzy 
objects of her desire, it would be wildly implausible to say that such 
objects exploit or otherwise manipulate that person's weakness for ill- 
gotten gain. Consequently, though objects, animals, and opportunities 
may tempt passively, only persons can tempt actively.L2 
Thus, being tempted involves a desire for what one believes is in 
some sense wrong or bad, along with a motive to fulfill that desire. It is 
also worth noting that being tempted has a characteristic feel not entirely 
expressed by the idea that one desires what one thinks is wrong or bad, 
even when such desires involve pro-attitudes. In that moment of moral 
vacillation constitutive of temptation, one is simultaneously disposed 
toward and opposed to evil rather than indifferent to it, irrespective of 
how that moment is resolved (i.e. whether one yields to or resists the 
temptat ion) .  Like all ambivalence ,  temptat ion is typical ly  an 
uncomfortable state, but it is not the case that all uncomfortable states 
are temptations. For example, we sometimes desire what we can't have 
(e.g. another person's spouse) and the fact that we want what isn't 
available; or what we shouldn't want, is distressing. Sometimes, too, we 
want what we c a n  (or even already) have, yet the desire is so intense 
(e.g. blinding infatuation for one's lover) as to make us miserable. These 
sorts of uncomfortable states involve desires, and they sometimes involve 
conflicting emotions, yet they need not function as motives, and are thus 
not temptations. Put differently, to be tempted cannot be just any dissonant 
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subjective state in which our desires are at odds with our feelings or 
beliefs about what we should have or do, because being tempted is 
desiring to do something believed to be evil, and is thus necessarily a 
motive. 
Temptat ion,  then, is an ambivalent  state, and is in part 
pleasurable.13 This positive affective dimension seems to be an essential 
element of the experience of temptation. Peter Abelard is explicit about 
this in his account of the role of temptation in sin. Abetard contends that 
If we already know that such a deed (i.e. a wrongful act) 
will be pleasant, our imagination is held by anticipatory 
delight and we are tempted thereby in thought. So long as 
we give consent to such a delight we sin. Lastly we pass to 
the third stage, and actually commit the sin. ~4 
Temptation is here conceived as involving anticipatory delight in 
doing something wrong. Anticipatory delight is an emotion, one which 
in this case has as its intentional object the expected pleasure of engaging 
in a wrongful act. This is not the same as sin, according to Abelard, for 
that latter condition requires something more than mere anticipatory 
delight in the prospect of pleasurable wrongdoing, namely, consent. To 
sin is to embrace or endorse one's anticipatory delight in pleasurable 
wrongdoing. Consenting is thus in the case of sin a second-order desire 
or attitude about a first-order desire; it is, in other words, an attitude that 
ratifies the lower-order desire to do what is wrong. ~5 By contrast, to be 
tempted is to be in a complex state of character partly defined by 
welcoming what we believe is wrong, but since we may be disgusted or 
otherwise repulsed by our anticipatory delight about prospective 
wrongdoing, the second-order attitude of consent is not a requirement of 
temptation. A second-order emotional attitude of some sort typically 
accompanies temptation in its standard moral sense, and the list of 
possible candidates is a long one. Such evaluative attitudes will 
presumably be negative, including such emotions as shame, regret, fear, 
disappointment, horror, guilt, confusion, anger, dread, and self-loathing. 
Perhaps such positive attitudes as amusement, glee, or wonder sometimes 
accompany temptation as well, though these would not seem to be 
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constitutive elements of  temptation. 16 So, embracing anticipatory delight 
is not a requirement of temptation, though possessing some critical 
emotional attitude toward that delight usually is. j7 
It is important to stress the difference between the first-order desire/ 
emotion of  temptation (i.e. anticipatory delight) and the second-order 
emotional attitude (e.g. shame) that is typical of  temptation in its full 
moral sense. To desire something is at least sometimes to be attracted to 
or have a pro-attitude toward it. But not all pro-attitudes are morally 
evaluative even if they are valuations in some sense (e.g. a dog craving 
a bone in some sense values the bone). Anticipatory delight is a necessary 
first-order constitutive desire/emotion of  temptation, and is thus a 
necessary but not sufficient condition of  being tempted. This first-order 
emotional attitude is different from the second-order critical attitudes of 
anger, confusion, fear, and attitudinal normative beliefs one or more of 
which must accompany the first-order desire for temptation in its full 
moral sense to occur. 
A final question about the phenomenology of  temptation needs to be 
addressed before we can determine the precise relationship between 
temptation and evil, and this has to do with the epistemic conditions of  
temptation. Specifically, does temptation require knowledge or merely 
the belief that the object of temptation is evil? Suppose, for the sake of  
argument, that to be tempted presupposes that we know that what we 
desire is wrong or bad. On this view, being tempted will depend on our 
desiring what is in fact  wrong. So long, therefore, as we believe truly 
that what we desire is wrong, we are being tempted. By contrast, if we 
do not know that what we desire is wrong or bad (e.g. we falsely believe 
that what we desire is wrong, or have no beliefs at all about the morality 
of  what we desire), then we cannot be tempted. This is so because what 
we desire either is not wrong at all, or it is not wrong in the way we think 
it is (though it may be wrong in some other sense). Imagine, for instance, 
that Jones believes that eating meat on Fridays is a sin. Further suppose, 
for argument's sake, that she is mistaken about this. Dining out with a 
friend one Friday night, Jones finds herself craving a steak dinner, which 
she sincerely believes she should not have. Her friend encourages her to 
satisfy her craving, arguing that in the "big picture" it can' t  matter very 
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much whether or not she eats meat on Fridays. On the assumption that 
being tempted requires knowing that what one desires is in some way 
wrong this would not be a case of  temptation. But this is extremely 
counterintuitive, for what else could it be but temptation? 
Thus, being tempted does not require that we know that what we 
desire is somehow wrong or bad. Instead, a weaker condition is all that 
is required, namely, we must believe that what we desire is wrong or 
bad. j8 This fills out the preceding phenomenolog ica l  account  of  
temptation, yielding the view that temptation is a complex psychological 
state involving desire, belief, motivation, and a characteristic affect. 
Whether or not temptation occurs thus depends essentially on the 
psychology of  the subject of  temptation rather than on the actions of a 
tempter. Try as one might, nobody can tempt another person unless the 
psychological pre-conditions of  being tempted are present, and these 
are, except in unusual cases, independent of  the actions of a tempter. ~9 
Perhaps, though, this last point is overstated since it assumes that because 
wrongful desires precede temptation they are therefore independent of 
the actions of  tempters. Rather, it may be that our routine temptations 
are caused by others who arrange environmental stimuli so as to generate 
our wrongful desires and the opportunities to fulfill them. The extent to 
which we are in this way intentionally or unintentionally "set up" for 
temptation raises large and complex questions about how socio-economic 
realities influence the formation and stimulation of  individual and 
collective desires and beliefs. It is enough to point out here that if to be 
tempted requires that we know that what we desire is wrong, then we 
will first need to know how such socio-economic phenomena shape and 
manipulate individual and collective beliefs and desires. This in turn 
would enable us to distinguish true from false beliefs. 2~ 
The epistemology of  temptation thus implies that if we believe that 
an illegal, immoral, or otherwise wrong act is permissible or obligatory, 
then we cannot be tempted to do it. This does not mean that a would-be 
tempter cannot attempt to tempt us. Nor does it mean that a would-be 
tempter cannot do such similar things as cajole, provoke, importune, or 
compel us to act wrongly, or reward, punish, or threaten us if we fail to 
do so, and for these modes of  influencing us a would-be tempter may be 
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held morally accountable. But attempting to tempt, cajoling, provoking, 
and other modes of influencing are not the same as tempting. 
3. The morality of tempting: A Preliminary (Kantian) Sketch 
I have argued that being tempted is an ambivalent state constituted 
in part by wanting to do what we believe is wrong. I have also claimed 
that this state involves a necessary link between temptation and perceived 
evil, and that although the connection between temptation and perceived 
evil is logically necessary, it does not follow that there is such a relation 
between temptation and actual evil. Consequently, it is possible to be 
tempted to do that which is in reality morally good. 
These facts raise the question of the moral status of temptation, with 
regard both to those who tempt and to those who are tempted. Although 
I have thus far focussed on the moral psychology of being tempted, since 
temptation is relational (even in cases of self-tempting), a plausible moral 
evaluation of temptation will need to be informed by both sides of the 
relation. Consequently, I shall in this and the following section discuss 
the moral status of tempting and of being tempted, alternating between 
an analysis of each. I begin with some observations on the morality of 
actively tempting. 
At the start of this paper I remarked that deliberately tempting others 
is morally dubious because it is often a form of manipulation, which is 
widely regarded as a violation of personal integrity. 2~ This view, along 
with the fact that it is possible to tempt someone to do what is right or 
good, implies that it is morally objectionable to tempt someone to do the 
right thing. But how can this be? 
My answer is Kantian in spirit, as is, I suspect, the common intuition 
that it is immoral to tempt others to do what is wrong. In manipulating 
another person we treat him as a means to an end, rather than as an end 
in himself. This is a violation of moral agency because it compromises 
moral autonomy. Respecting the moral autonomy of others requires that 
we allow them to make their own moral decisions. What is morally 
objectionable about tempting someone to do the right thing is the attempt 
to persuade him to act contrary to his beliefs about what he should do. If 
successful, such an effort results in his doing the right thing by a tempter's 
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design, a scheme which robs him of the possibility of behaving in a 
morally worthy manner, if, pace Kant, moral worth requires intending 
to do what is right, n So, it is at least sometimes wrong to use another as 
a means to moral goodness. 
This evaluation is complicated, though not altered, by the fact that 
tempting another person to do what is right admits of two versions. On 
the one hand, a tempter may know that what he is encouraging another 
person to do is morally (or legally, prudentially, etc.) right though the 
person tempted believes it is wrong. On the other hand, a tempter may 
take himself to be urging another person to do something she thinks is 
wrong, something which the person tempted also believes is wrong, but 
which is in fact right? 3 Either option, as far as I can tell, admits of the 
aforementioned qualified Kantian assessment of the morality of tempting. 
This is so since in either case a tempter manipulates his victim, thereby 
compromising the latter's dignity as a moral agent. 
With regard to the moral status of the flip side of the relation, that is, 
the moral status of those who are tempted, the immorality of desiring 
what we believe is wrong or bad is straightforward. We shouldn't desire 
or do what we think is wrong. Being tempted to do the right thing is, 
accordingly, a special case of this more general judgment, and right 
actions motivated by temptation are right actions done, in a sense, f o r  
the wrong reason. Yielding to such temptations also admits of a Kantian 
negative moral analysis, since doing what we think is wrong cannot be, 
by definition, acting from duty (i.e. doing what's right because it's right). 
Since there are different ways of being tempted to do the right thing, 
there are different moral evaluations appropriate to them. As noted above, 
a person might possess false beliefs about the morality of an action and 
so be tempted to do what is in fact right. If one yielded to such a temptation 
he would presumably be blameworthy for doing what he believed was 
wrong, though this judgment might be tempered by the fact that his 
ignorance was understandable and the temptation very strong. But other 
temptations to do the right thing are morally worse insofar as they involve 
a greater degree of intentionality and/or the presence of morally 
undesirable character traits like selfishness. Just such a case is the object 
of T.S. Eliot's pronouncement that "the last temptation is the greatest 
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treason: to do the right thing for the wrong reason." Eliot tells of an 
Archbishop who, successful in resisting various worldly offers to stray 
from his service to God, in the end yields to his selfish desire for a lofty 
reputation among men. 24 This example shows how self interest often 
figures prominently in temptation, and illustrates too that people 
sometimes invoke morality itself (or religious ideals) to rationalize 
yielding to temptation. 25 Temptations that involve taking the moral high 
road are, in fact, as mundane as they are despicable. The phenomenon of 
malicious truth-telling is a clear case. A busybody with a grudge against 
his neighbor may reveal an unpleasant and professionally damaging truth 
about that neighbor to the media, invoking as justification the rationale 
that publicizing the truth is always morally permissible. The idea that 
the truth is its own justification coincides with the widespread conviction 
that honesty is a moral virtue. Although recognized in law as a defense 
against libel and slander, this intuition is denied in the doctrine of 
"malicious truth." The core idea of the doctrine of malicious truth is that 
publicizing damaging truths that serve no public interest, or doing so 
from unworthy motives (e.g. revenge) is beyond the protection of the 
law. 26 The "truth" is thus not always its own justification. 27 Similar 
intuitions are relevant in determining the morality of publicizing 
damaging truths, and just as we can distinguish malicious (and 
unjustified) truths from justified yet damaging ones in law, so too we 
can distinguish immoral malicious truths from damaging truths that are 
morally permissible or even obligatory to make public. If, for example, 
one comes across information that one's employer is extorting sexual 
favors from a colleague, or embezzling funds, or taking bribes from a 
competitor, then one arguably has a moral duty to publicize that 
information, particularly if doing so is the only or the best way to combat 
the injustice. But if one's motive for publicizing such information is 
retaliation for having been passed over for promotion, and not because 
one has a duty to publicize it, then we have the sort of case in which a 
person yields to a temptation to do what is right or good in a way that 
renders him more vile than he would be if he yielded to a similar 
temptation but was blamelessly mistaken about what was, in fact, morally 
right. 
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Thus, what makes yielding to some temptations to do the right thing 
worse than others is the role of deliberation and morally undesirable 
character traits or motivations in being tempted an/or in yielding to 
temptation. In other words, what makes some temptations to do the right 
thing worse than others is that consciousness and intentionality render a 
person more complicit in temptation than is the case with those 
temptations wherein ignorance of what is right and the strength of our 
desires combine to motivate action. 
4. The Morality of Temptation: Further Considerations 
There is, of course, more to the morality of being tempted than a 
Kantian-inspired analysis reveals, and in fact such a view is arguably 
misguided, for if an action is morally right, then it cannot be wrong to 
perform it, notwithstanding the fact that the action may cause great 
hardship. Moreover, even though people sometimes do the right thing 
for immoral reasons, such as to take revenge on an enemy, it would be a 
mistake to insist that doing the right thing for the wrong reason means 
that one has not done the right thing. Instead, we can parse the morality 
of actions into overt physical behaviors, on the one hand, and internal 
mental and other characterological phenomena, on the other. In so doing 
we recognize, of course, that mental states (such as desires, motives, 
intentions, and emotions) and character traits, dispositions, proclivities, 
and temperament influence our evaluation of human actions, but that 
there is more to the morality of behavior than these. Indeed, the divergence 
between motivation and deed is what gives Eliot's "greatest treason" 
temptation its force, and allows us to recognize that yielding to a 
temptation to perform a right action from ignoble motives such as 
revenge, contempt, or malice is, far from being impossible, not even 
especially rare. 
It might also be objected that this Kantian account of the immorality 
of being tempted to do the right thing assumes what needs to be 
demonstrated, since the description of malicious-truth telling and similar 
cases ignores the fact that the persons tempted are doing something they 
believe is morally objectionable, and thus that they do not regard 
themselves as doing the right thing. The fact that they see themselves as 
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doing something wrong does, of course, help explain how they can be 
tempted, since temptation requires the belief that what one wants to do 
is somehow wrong. But a more plausible description of malicious truth- 
telling and similar cases of doing the right thing for the wrong reason is 
that those who do such things are tempted to do what they think is wrong 
(e.g. work off a grudge, take revenge on an enemy, etc.), not right. It is, 
therefore, at least misleading to say they are tempted to do the right 
thing. 
This objection is correct insofar as a full description of the goings on 
in malicious truth-telling and similar cases must reveal that the person 
tempted takes himself to be doing something inappropriate; otherwise 
there are no grounds for saying he is tempted. Still, if it is legally or 
morally permissible or even obligatory to reveal damaging information, 
the motives and beliefs of the person doing so do not change that fact, 
and it is right to publicize such information. That one does the right 
thing by yielding to temptation is what allows us to describe such a case 
as doing the right thing for the wrong reason. 2s 
The matter is even more complex, for not all temptations are 
intentional, and this fact bears on the moral status of those who tempt 
and those who are tempted. Because one may intentionally or 
unintentionally stimulate another's wrongful desires, there are two main 
cases of interpersonal temptation. Deliberately stimulating others' 
wrongful desires is, as I have argued, a form of manipulation or 
exploitation. By contrast, unintentionally stimulating others' unruly 
desires may be regarded as a kind of "innocent" temptation. 29 If this 
distinction between manipulative and innocent temptation is sound, then 
temptation involving manipulation is a necessary though insufficient 
condition for the moral blameworthiness of a tempter, even when she 
tempts someone to do what is actually morally right or good. The concept 
of temptation thus does not entail immorality on the part either of 
someone who (deliberately or innocently) tempts, or of the person 
tempted, even when tempting involves engaging a person's desire for 
what he regards as wrong. So, tempting and being tempted are not 
necessarily immoral. 
Still, the link between evil and temptation is a strong and not easily 
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defeasible one, for persons' normative beliefs do not occur in a social 
vacuum. Rather, personal beliefs about morality, religion, aesthetics, 
etiquette, law, and politics are normally connected to more widely held 
community beliefs, beliefs the internalization of which partly define us 
as the sort of moral agents we are. This connection means that being 
tempted usually involves desiring what one, and one's society, believes 
is inappropriate in one way or another, and ordinary cases of temptation, 
for example, being tempted to cheat on one's lover, or underpay taxes, 
or eavesdrop on private conversations, show this. As I suggested earlier, 
temptation is an essentially relational phenomenon, not a passion play 
that occurs exclusively in one's own private mental theater. With no 
relation to a social context that provides the setting in which temptations 
occur and derive their moral meaning, nobody could ever tempt or be 
tempted. 
This fact about the genesis and social connectedness of personal 
beliefs should serve as a corrective to the possibly misleading impression 
conveyed in the earlier analysis of the role of individual beliefs in the 
phenomenology of temptation. Tempting and being tempted are 
ordinarily immoral, for they involve the real or at least perceived attempt 
to transgress social norms central to our identity as moral agents. Thus, 
the logical possibility that one may be tempted to do what is morally 
good does nothing to alter the fact that temptation and moral evil are for 
practical purposes closely linked. This fact, though, should be tempered 
by the possibility noted above that the socio-economic context in which 
we are shaped and our relations with others are structured may be 
complicit in our temptations to a greater degree than we are aware. Thus, 
the link between temptation and genuine evil may remain obscure. 
Clearly, a person may be tempted to do what is in fact right by the 
circuitous route of having one's false beliefs about the impropriety of an 
act exploited by a tempter. One may also be tempted to do what is right 
by being motivated by or yielding to morally despicable desires (e.g. 
revenge) to do the right thing. But these possibilities do not shed light 
on whether one may be tempted to do what one believes is right. The 
truth conditions for the following statements suggest a crucial difference 
between temptation and perceived evil, on the one hand, and temptation 
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and perceived goodness, on the other; a difference which argues against 
the possibility of  being tempted to do that which one believes is right: 
(A) I was tempted to steal the money left unguarded on the desk. 
(B) I was tempted to donate my lottery winnings to charity. 
Note that (B) seems to require more information to articulate its full 
sense, while (A) does not. This of  course may be because people do not 
typically donate prize winnings to charity, but that fact actually supports 
the standard sense of temptation as involving wrongdoing, rather than 
its involving morally right, obligatory, or supererogatory behavior. So, 
we expect someone who utters (B) to complete the thought by saying 
something like "rather than spend it on my wife," or "rather than spend 
it on the new car I 've  been promising myself," and the like. But (A) 
does not require this sort of  "rather than" clause for its completion; it 
would be linguistically perverse for someone to say, "I was tempted to 
steal the money left unguarded on the desk, rather than leave it alone," 
or, "rather than leave it for its rightful owner." This suggests that the 
notion that one may be tempted to do that which one believes is right 
does not make sense on its own, that some further explanation is necessary 
to make it plausible. 3~ By contrast, the notion that one may be tempted to 
do wrong is a complete thought. Consequently, it does not seem possible 
to be tempted to do what one thinks is morally right or good. 
The logic of temptation is such that, finally, if the distinction between 
exploitive and innocent temptation is sound, it follows that innocent 
temptation does not reflect immorally on a tempter, for he does not 
deliberately engage the unruly desires of another person. 31 This still leaves 
unresolved the full moral status of  the person tempted, which status is 
connected, in part, to the origins and persistence of  his wrongful desires. 
To shed light on this topic requires clarifying key issues about the 
formation of, and responsibility for, personal character, which is beyond 
the scope of  this essay. Perhaps it is safe to say at least that if you are 
tempted to do what is morally wrong, then your desire for wrongdoing 
is prima facie evidence of a morally flawed character. The nature and 
scope of  such a flaw is itself a complex matter, since we would need to 
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determine the full moral status of being tempted. And this would involve 
determining whether our susceptibility to temptation is an inveterate and 
ineliminable moral imperfection, or something that is correctable. We 
would also need to determine the moral status of  yielding to temptation 
(is this indicative of  a certain sort of  general powerlessness or inability 
to control ourselves, or, instead, is it evidence only of occasional lapses 
of  willpower?). These issues suggest that even if we are the authors of 
our character, there are further questions about how temptations and our 
reactions to them reflect on us, and whether  in the end we are 
blameworthy for having wrongful desires. And, even if we are not the 
authors of our character, manipulative and innocent temptations may 
yet reflect negatively on us if only in the sense that we are morally worse 
persons than we would otherwise be if we did not possess wrongful 
desires? 2 The resolution of  these issues is a topic for another paper. 
5. Conclusion 
In this essay I have attempted to shed some light on temptation, 
arguing that there are two main senses of the concept. One sense of  
temptation is used casually to refer to garden variety desires and 
attractions, and another, the main moral sense, connotes a desire for what 
one thinks is in some way wrong. I have claimed, furthermore, that 
analyzing temptation from the standpoint of a tempter, and taking 
deliberate interpersonal temptat ions as paradigmatic ,  ul t imately 
misconstrues temptation by under-appreciating the essential role of  the 
subject of temptation. Without an adequate phenomenology of  what it is 
to be tempted, temptation as a relation between a tempter and a person 
tempted cannot be understood. The phenomenology of  temptation reveals, 
moreover, the epistemic requirement that a person tempted need only 
believe that what she desires is somehow inappropriate, and thus that 
the link between temptation and objective evil is a contingent, not a 
logically necessary, one. I have also suggested that the assignment of 
moral blame when persons are tempting or are tempted depends in part 
on whether a tempter intentionally or unintentionally tempts. It depends 
too on what a tempter takes himself to be doing when he deliberately 
tempts someone else and on the role of choice and control in the formation 
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and perseverance  o f  our wrongfu l  desires.  This  last factor  depends,  in 
turn, on issues related to the const ruct ion o f  moral  character.  
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NOTES 
* I thank Robert Holland and H. Skott Brill for helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines temptation as "The action of tempting 
or fact of  being tempted, esp. to evil" (Second edition, 1989, Volume XVII, 
p.759). The Oxford American Dictionary defines the primary sense of"tempt" 
as "to persuade or try to persuade (especially into doing something wrong or 
unwise) by the prospect of pleasure or advantage." (New York, Avon Books, 
1980, p.706). 
Questions about responsibility for character arise naturally in this context, 
and some philosophers have argued that a person may be blameworthy for 
weakness of will or other moral infirmities if such defects are a consequence 
of blameworthy failures to develop relevant character traits. See, for example, 
Gary Watson, "Skepticism about weakness of will," (The Philosophical 
Review, Vol.86, 1977, pp.316-339). 
3 For a fuller account of the active dimension of temptation see my "Temptation 
and the manipulation of desire." Journal of Value Inquiry 33:371-379, 1999. 
4 Oxford American Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 1980), p.948. 
5 Op.Cit. 
6 J.P.Day, "Temptation," American Philosophical Quarterly, 30.2, (April, 
1993), pp.175-183. 
7 Day, op.cit. 
8 Hereafter I use the phrases "wrongful desires" and "unruly desires" as 
shorthand for "desiring what is in some sense wrong." As will become clear, 
I subjectivize this as "desiring what one believes is in some sense wrong" to 
accord with my view that temptation is an essentially subjective phenomenon. 
9 See Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person." 
(Journal of Philosophy, Volume LXVIII, No. 1, January, 1971, pp.5-20) for 
an account of how various desires may coexist without any one of them 
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being a person's "effective desire" (i.e. his "will", or what I am here calling 
his "motivation"). 
~0 I should perhaps make clear here that I regard motives as intermediate between 
Frankfurt's desires and his notion of an effective desire. A person may possess 
desires which exert no behavioral influence at the moment (and perhaps 
never in their life), or desires that compete as candidates for effective desires 
that in fact motivate present behavior (i.e. effective desires). This trio of 
desire-types clarifies the nature of temptation by making clear its motivational 
aspect while yet allowing for the reality that people sometimes resist the 
pull of temptation. 
" On the aforementioned manipulation theory of temptation, all intentional 
temptations are thought to be immoral, and so are typically masked as ordinary 
"offers." See Day, op.cit., p. 176. 
~2 Persons, too, may tempt passively, and although objects, animals, and 
opportunities do not make offers, they can be part of an offer by being used 
to manipulate persons' unruly desires, and in this way may be involved in 
active temptations. 
t3 The Oxford English Dictionary alludes to this in defining "tempt" as "to 
persuade or try to persuade (especially into doing something wrong or unwise) 
by the prospect of pleasure or advantage." Emphasis added. My description 
of temptation as an ambivalent state is an effort to render intelligible the 
emotional attitudes that this definition connotes. When tempted one is usually 
aware of an action, object, or event one thinks it would be somehow wrong 
to perform, possess, or experience, and yet which one welcomes. 
,4 Peter Abelard, "Desire and Sin," reprinted in Christina Hoff Sommers, Vice 
and Virtue in Everyday Life, third edition (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
1993), p.360. See also Peter Abelard, Ethical Writings, translated by Paul 
Vincent Spade (Hackett Publishing, 1995), pp.14-16, passim. 
~s To sin therefore involves a second-order desire that renders a first-order 
desire effective. That is, one sins when one wills to do wrong, and this involves 
choosing to make the first-order desire of anticipatory delight in wrongdoing 
one's motive to action. Note that on Frankfurt's view only persons have this 
ability to enact second-order desires. I suggest this ability is a mark not only 
of personhood, but of moral agency as welt. This means that the present 
account of temptation applies only to beings capable of second-order desires, 
which are inherently evaluative. This is as it should be, since the temptations 
of infants, dogs, and other non-moral agents are properly explicable only as 
first-order desires (i.e. the desires of non-moral agents). 
~6 I say such second-order emotional attitudes would presumably be negative 
106 
THE LOGIC OF TEMPTATION 
since temptation is a state of ambivalence requiring that its constitutive 
positive attitude (anticipatory delight) be opposed by a negative second- 
order attitude of the sorts listed. The presence of other, even positive, 
emotional attitudes in the experience of temptation is not ruled out by this 
analysis, though such emotions will not be necessary elements of temptation. 
Moreover, I contrast Abelard's notion of  "consent" as an attitude with 
emotional attitudes because temptation is an ambivalent state, whereas sinning 
may not be. One may wholeheartedly sin, experiencing no conflicting 
emotions or attitudes about it, but to be tempted is to be divided. 
~7 Perhaps the idea that a second-order critical emotional attitude toward 
anticipatory delight typically accompanies temptation over-intellectualizes 
the phenomenology of many temptations. A child of twelve may have no 
second-order emotional attitude about the anticipatory delight of his 
temptation to steal candy, yet possess a critical attitude of another sort, namely, 
that stealing is wrong, his parents would be furious if he did it and they 
found out, etc. The object of these sorts of critical beliefs would be the act of 
stealing, not the anticipatory delight of the temptation to steal. This means 
that the internal conflict necessary for temptation need not be between 
anticipatory delight and another higher order emotional attitude, but may 
instead be constituted by a conflict between a normative bel ief  about the 
wrongness of yielding to temptation and the first order emotional attitude of 
anticipatory delight. This preserves the ambivalence required of temptation, 
as long as the normative beliefs in question are "attitudinal" as such beliefs 
are construed by philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and R.M. Hare. 
~8 It might be objected that this weaker "bel ief '  requirement of temptation is 
still too strong, since it appears to rule out the possibility of tempting young 
children who neither know nor believe that what they desire is wrong. There 
is, however, a distinction between tempting and other modes of influencing 
persons, and cases involving young children seem to me more akin to luring, 
enticing, or simply offering, none of which require either knowledge or the 
belief that what we desire is wrong. Moreover, insisting on the belief 
requirement in cases involving very young children is a mistake, for they 
are not yet moral agents in the full sense of that term and do not have the 
requisite second-order attitudes to experience temptation morally. 
19 They are independent of the actions of a tempter in the minimal sense, at 
least, in which in deliberate interpersonal temptation for someone to be 
tempted he must already possess wrongful desires and be in a weakened 
state of resistance with respect to them. What the tempter typically adds to 
this mix is a desirable illicit object, often supplemented by goading, 
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persuasion, or deceit. These sorts of activities no doubt often contribute to 
the weakening of another person's will, and perhaps most cases of (intentional 
or unintentional) interpersonal temptation involve this. Of course, truly 
insidious tempters might implant the wrongful desires they then manipulate. 
This latter possibility is not far removed from the psychological principle 
known as priming, the activating of concepts in our minds that affect how 
we behave. Though this happens naturally in response to environmental 
stimuli, it can be deliberately effected for purposes of manipulation, as when 
advertisers link sales messages to images unrelated to their products in an 
effort to influence consumer behavior, or when police entrap innocent citizens 
into committing crimes. For an account of priming and its use in manipulative 
messages see John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life (Eribaum, 
1997). 
20 This is a potentially enormous undertaking since it would involve, at the 
very least, a psychological theory that would allow us to distinguish authentic 
from inauthentic desires, as well as a moral epistemology that enabled us to 
distinguish true from false moral beliefs. 
z~ The interesting, though puzzling, case of tempting God escapes this analysis. 
In a symposium on the nature of religious assertions (reprinted in God, 
Timothy Robinson, ed., Hackett Publishing, 1996, pp.96-105), Basil Mitchell 
invokes this idea in the context of  contrasting the Christian conviction that 
God exists with the agnostic idea that the claim "God exists" is a "provisional 
hypothesis to be discarded if experience tells against (it)." The Christian, 
Mitchell tells us, "is precluded by his faith" from adopting the agnostic stance, 
for "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." Tempt the Lord to do what? If 
God is wholly good, then isn't temptation impossibl e for Him? It might yet 
be wrong to try to tempt God, and morally wrong to do so. But this would be 
an impossible attempt, since it is impossible for God to be tempted in view 
of the fact that His omnibenevolence is incompatible with His desiring evil 
of any kind. Of course, the usual interpretation of tempting God relates to 
"testing" Him. People sometimes predicate their faith in God on His not 
allowing certain evils to transpire in their lives, in effect conveying the 
message that their faith is contingent upon how God behaves. This sense of 
tempting God clearly does not assume that God could desire evil. 
22 This Kantian assessment should be qualified, since the broader moral schemes 
in which individual temptations are embedded may justify tempting others 
(even to do that which is morally right) on the grounds that doing so is, all 
things considered, the morally best course of action. For example, Oskar 
Schindler's bribing of German soldiers to allow Jews to escape N~zi death 
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camps by routing them to Schindler's factories seems to be a morally 
laudatory instance of tempting people to do the right thing. 
23 Both possibilities reflect the fact that the link between temptation and evil is 
contingent, since encouraging someone to do what you falsely believe is 
wrong, and falsely believing that what you desire is evil, are subjective 
perceptions that need not correspond to reality. Moreover, both possibilities 
require that the person tempted must believe that what she wants to do is 
wrong, otherwise temptation cannot occur. 
24 The "last" temptation refers to the fourth in a series of temptations of Thomas 
Beckett, Archbishop of Canterbury, in Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral. 
Though the first three tempters try to seduce Beckett with mundane rewards 
such as political power and material gain, the fourth plays on Beckett's pride 
in renouncing such worldly goods in the name of serving God, The last 
temptation is thus an effort to lure Beckett into refusing earthly enticements 
in order to achieve a lasting reputation as a steadfast servant of God. But this 
is to use God as a means to one's own glory, rather than to use oneself to 
glorify God. Hence, the last temptation, "to do the right thing for the wrong 
reason," is the greatest treason. 
25 Compare Martin Luther King's accusation that the Birmingham, Alabama, 
police used "the moral means of nonviolence to maintain the immoral end 
of racial injustice" as a different example of taking the moral high road in 
doing the right thing for the wrong reason. See King's Letter from Birmingham 
Jail, reprinted in Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross, Philosophy of Law, 
Wadsworth, 5 'h edition, 1995, p.120. 
26 See Joel Feinberg, "Limits to the free expression of opinion," (Philosophy 
of Law, Feinberg and Gross, eds., Wadsworth, 1995, fifth edition, pp.255- 
256). 
27 Ibid. Feinberg points out that only in the most egregious cases has criminal 
liability been imposed for defamation, but that there are civil remedies for 
harm caused to one's reputation by having been defamed. Presumably, the 
same sort of legal remedies might be extended to victims in malicious truth 
cases. 
28 Doing the wrong thing for the right reason is also possible, as cases of legal 
entrapment illustrate. Though in many cases of entrapment police manipulate 
persons' wrongful desires in order to incite criminal conduct (by, e.g., leaving 
an unattended suitcase in a bus station), they sometimes take advantage of 
such morally laudatory traits as kindness and friendliness, causing persons 
to act wrongly (i.e. illegally) for right (i.e. morally commendable) reasons. 
Though legal philosophers frequently view entrapment as a kind of excusable 
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temptation, there is a puzzle about this if one believes, with George Fletcher, 
that succumbing to temptation is "a paradigm case of blameworthy behavior." 
See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, (Little Brown, 1978), p.542. See 
also J.D. Heydon, "The Problems of Entrapment," Cambridge Law Journal 
32.2, November, 1973, pp.268-286. 
59 The moral status of deliberate intrapersonal (i.e. entirely self-referential) 
temptation is perhaps partly illuminated by the same sort of Kantian analysis 
I have applied to interpersonal temptation. Indeed, deliberately stimulating 
one's own wrongful desires seems to be a clear case of using a person (oneself) 
as a means to an end, but here the analysis gets murky, for what is the "end" 
for which one uses oneself when one deliberately tempts oneself?. We may, 
of course, be weak, and deliberately tempt ourselves knowing we will yield 
to the temptation and experience the pleasure (and other feelings) of 
wrongdoing. In such cases we use ourselves as a means to evil. But 
intentionally subjecting oneself to temptation may have a nobler purpose, 
such as seeking greater moral self-knowledge by "testing" one's virtues. 
Surely this is not necessarily wrong. Perhaps a Kantian analysis of  the 
morality of temptation would acknowledge the moral permissibility of  self- 
tempting for purposes of  promoting moral autonomy. In this way s e l l  
tempting may be compatible with treating oneself as an end (with dignity 
and respect) while simultaneously using oneself as a means. 
3o Provided that the utterance is not an instance of non-moral temptation like 
those discussed at the start of this paper. If it is non-moral, then its meaning 
is clear by itself. 
3t Unless a tempter should know of certain effects he has on others, in which 
case his unintentional stimulation of another person' s wrongful desires may 
be blameworthy. 
32 We should bear in mind that a person may be blamelessly morally despicable. 
A person who routinely causes undeserved harm to others from a habitual 
exercise of vices which dominate her character may not be responsible (i.e. 
morally blameworthy) either for possessing the vices or for the harm caused 
by them. It does not follow from this, however, that such a person is not 
morally censurable. 
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